These pages, marked with GREEN headings,
are published for comment
and criticism. These are not our final findings; some of these opinions
will probably change.LOG OF UPDATES
Administration Options for Molecular Manufacturing
This
page is more preliminary than the others. CRN
is not recommending these solutions yet; we need to do more research
before we will know what can work in the real world. However, we do
think that each of the problems addressed by these solutions must
be dealt with somehow.
Overview: Once molecular
manufacturing is developed, it will have to be administered. There
are several approaches that might help. CRN is not advocating any of these
approaches at this point; we don't know enough about how the technology
will be developed or in what context. We also have to point out that we
don't think any one approach will be enough. Any effective program will
require a balance of several different kinds of administration. Some possibilities
include built-in technical
restrictions in personal
nanofactories; intellectual property reform; and international
cooperation, monitoring, or regulation of various kinds. Despite the
difficulties and complexities, we believe that a solution can be found
to preserve most of the potential benefits while avoiding the most
severe risks.
Administration
of MNT will need several approaches.
Administration of molecular
nanotechnology (MNT) will require several cooperating approaches.
As discussed on our No
Simple Solutions page, any single approach can reduce only a few
of the risks—while
greatly increasing other risks. This page lists a few options for
administrative approaches. The list is not complete, of course, and
some of these may turn out to be unnecessary or even counterproductive.
CRN will be working to develop more options and evaluate the ones
already proposed. We strongly encourage other groups to do the same.
Because unleashed
molecular manufacturing is so dangerous, the best solution appears to
be careful administration of the technology, including some mandatory
restrictions. Fortunately, the same features that make MNT dangerous also
allow the implementation of several kinds of technological restriction
that may form useful components of an overall administration program. Products that
might be adapted for unauthorized molecular manufacturing pose a serious
threat to MNT security. Other products pose other kinds of threats, and
additional restriction will probably be desirable. Still, many products,
once approved, can be built freely—and for some classes of products,
approval can be a rapid and automated process. MNT-built functionality
will be amazingly compact: a supercomputer could fit inside a grain of
sand. This allows a human-scale product, such as a personal
nanofactory, to include dedicated security or monitoring hardware.
Massive computer power can help with several other problems, including
privacy-safe surveillance and patent reform.
An
international program is probably necessary. (MORE)
International
administration appears to be necessary for several reasons. Some of the
risks of molecular nanotechnology are potentially global in scope. At
least one of the sources of risk, the possibility of a nanotech arms race,
is explicitly international. Even well-intentioned and well-policed nations
cannot always prevent internal terrorism, and companies with strong financial
incentive do not always design secure products. Each additional MNT program
increases the risk that unrestricted molecular manufacturing will fall
into the wrong hands. For all these reasons, it seems best to have a single,
trustworthy, international administration imposing tight controls on the
technology. However, unless the technology is made widely available for
a wide variety of applications and purposes, there will be strong incentive
for independent MNT programs. Any successful administration program must
satisfy many competing interests.
We
need to start working now; this will take a lot of planning. (MORE)
Molecular nanotechnology
will emerge suddenly, perhaps within the next ten years, and probably
within the next twenty. If it takes the world by surprise, we will not
have systems in place that can deal with it. No single organization or
mindset can create a full and appropriate policy—and inappropriate
policy will only make things worse. A combination of separate policy efforts
will get in each other's way, and the risks will slip through the cracks.
By the time MNT arrives, we must have accomplished several things that
each take significant time. First, we must understand the risks. Second,
make policy. Third, design institutions. Fourth, create the institutions—at
all levels including international levels, where things move slowly. This
could easily take twenty years. If advanced nanotechnology could arrive
in ten or fifteen years, then we'd better get to work.
The Center for Responsible
Nanotechnology has developed a tentative outline for the international
administration of molecular nanotechnology. Under this proposal, a self-contained,
secure molecular manufacturing system—a nanofactory—would
be developed in a closely guarded crash program. The nanofactory would
be released for widespread use. A personal nanofactory would only be able
to make approved products, or approved classes of products, and the approval
process could be quite flexible without giving up too much control. Very
few products, even military products, require a built-in molecular manufacturing
capability. Families of products could be classified according to increasing
product safety and MNT containment. Only unusually dangerous products
would require any human approval. At the same time, the built-in restriction
infrastructure would allow military, commercial, and societal interests
to be protected. Intellectual property could be protected without discouraging
innovation or preventing humanitarian aid.
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