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pages, marked with GREEN headings, are published for comment
and criticism. These are not our final findings; some of
these opinions will probably change. LOG
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Overview of
all studies: Because of the largely unexpected transformational
power of molecular manufacturing, it is urgent to understand the issues
raised. To date, there has not been anything approaching an adequate study
of these issues. CRN's recommended series of thirty
essential studies is organized into five sections, covering fundamental
theory, possible technological capabilities, bootstrapping potential,
product capabilities, and policy questions. Several preliminary conclusions
are stated, and because our understanding points to a crisis, a parallel
process of conducting the studies is urged.
CRN is actively
looking for researchers interested in performing or assisting with this
work. Please contact CRN Research Director Chris
Phoenix if you would like more information or if you have comments
on the proposed studies.
Study
#22
How
can proliferation and use of nanofactories and their products be limited?
This study will
explore the challenge of preventing black markets, independent development,
etc.
Subquestion
How
easy will it be to detect a development program?
Preliminary answer
Probably quite difficult.
Development does not require exotic materials or massive industrial activity.
It may require mainly off-the-shelf technology. Researchers will be from
diverse and common fields like software engineering and computational
chemistry, not concentrated in one exotic field. Depending on the bootstrapping
'recipe', the design effort might be dispersed (networked/teleconferenced),
and the entire physical operation might be carried out in one moderate-sized
laboratory. And most of the research would not require world-class talent,
though a successful program today might well require world-class leadership.
Subquestion
How
much easier will it be to develop a second nanofactory, compared with
developing the first one?
Preliminary answer
Reverse engineering
will give hints as to which path to take. The definite knowledge that
it can be done at all will reduce institutional friction. General technology
advances will give a second program more to work with. Any leaks of know-how
or software will further reduce the difficulty. It seems likely that the
second nanofactory will be an order of magnitude less costly.
Subquestion
How
can nanoscale products be detected?
Preliminary answer
Unknown. Nanoporous
filters can trap them. Non-proximal sub-wavelength optics, if they work
as claimed, may be able to scan for them at a distance—but there
are lots of natural nanoparticles, so recognition is also a problem. MRI
may be able to detect at a distance, though resolution is a problem and
there may be a theoretical limit.
Subquestion
How
easy will it be to smuggle nanofactories?
Preliminary answer
A fully functional
nanofactory, able (given a supply of feedstock, energy, and blueprint
software) to make one twice as big (and so on) and thus recreate a full
manufacturing capacity, could be just a few microns on a side—small
enough to hide inside a human cell. Or any convenient size in between.
We don't know of any way to detect something like that without total intrusion
of the volume being searched, which probably implies destruction.
Subquestion
How
easy will it be to detect proliferation-related activity?
Preliminary answer
Quite difficult.
Especially once the 'recipe' is known, it will be very hard to spot a
project—R&D for a nanofactory project may require only a single
small lab and a few computers. (For comparison, consider Zyvex.)
Subquestion
How
effective will deterrence be?
Preliminary answer
To someone lacking
a comparable capability, a nanofactory would be incredibly valuable. This
implies that deterrence will not be successful.
Conclusion
It
will be very difficult to limit proliferation of nanofactory technology
and possession of bootleg nanofactories.
The situation is
extremely urgent. The stakes are unprecedented, and the world is unprepared.
The basic findings of these studies should be verified as rapidly as possible
(months, not years). Policy preparation and planning for implementation,
likely including a crash development program, should begin immediately.
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