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Overview of
all studies: Because of the largely unexpected transformational
power of molecular manufacturing, it is urgent to understand the issues
raised. To date, there has not been anything approaching an adequate study
of these issues. CRN's recommended series of thirty
essential studies is organized into five sections, covering fundamental
theory, possible technological capabilities, bootstrapping potential,
product capabilities, and policy questions. Several preliminary conclusions
are stated, and because our understanding points to a crisis, a parallel
process of conducting the studies is urged.
CRN is actively
looking for researchers interested in performing or assisting with this
work. Please contact CRN Research Director Chris
Phoenix if you would like more information or if you have comments
on the proposed studies.
Study
#20
What
effect will molecular manufacturing have on military and government
capability and planning, considering the implications of arms races
and unbalanced development?
It has been predicted
that a sufficiently advanced and general-purpose molecular manufacturing
(MM) technology could have a significant destabilizing effect. This
must be explored.
Subquestion
How quickly
can new weapons be invented, designed and deployed?
Preliminary answer
Very quickly. (See
the previous few studies.)
Subquestion
What new
theatres or contexts for conflict will be created? (Outer space, cyberspace,
underground, other?)
Preliminary answer
It will become
quite important to be able to detect very small devices—perhaps
even sub-microscopic devices. Outer space will become much easier to
reach. Millionfold increases in computer power will create new opportunities.
Extremely large-scale sensor networks, backed by large-scale computers,
may make some environments (such as the ocean) less opaque. Living organisms
(especially humans) are high-value and perhaps high-resource targets,
and may require advanced engineering to monitor and protect without
excessive disruption. Data-mining from massive sensor arrays and human
transaction monitoring may be crucial; this will probably be limited
more by software than by hardware. The sensor networks themselves, and
disrupting or hiding from them, may be a focus of conflict, but one
that is likely to be won by the sensors (see David Brin, The
Transparent Society).
Subquestion
To what
extent will portable manufacturing allow forces to be autonomous of
supply?
Preliminary answer
Manufacturing of
just about anything from clothing to missiles should be feasible with
only raw materials. Advances in thermal depolymerization technology
may allow conversion of local plant matter into feedstock with a relatively
small (man-portable) chemical plant.
Subquestion
To what
extent will advanced technology allow forces to be remotely or autonomously
controlled?
Preliminary answer
Any algorithm that
can be run on a supercomputer today will be able to run onboard even
a bullet or insect-format robot. This implies rather good image recognition.
Also, the ability to field as many UAV or smart dust relays as desired
will allow very high-bandwidth networking. Improved robotics, displays,
and sensory or even neural interfaces can greatly enhance telepresence.
Subquestion
What impacts
will human augmentation (including direct brain interface) have?
Preliminary answer
Unknown at this
time, but probably includes significantly improved reaction time, situational
awareness, telepresence, teleoperation of robots, fully immersive VR,
and enhanced memory/cognition.
Subquestion
What impacts
will advanced data gathering and data processing have?
Preliminary answer
A full-coverage
sensor network with full storage seems plausible. This would give the
ability to see and hear anything from any angle at any time in the present
or past (after the network was installed, of course). Image processing
should allow tracking of people through time. Data mining based on image
processing should allow connections to be found and highlighted (for
example, full speech-to-text conversion of all conversations, followed
by text searching to determine where the other end of a phone call went).
This could greatly
surpass DARPA's TIA, and enable DARPA's LifeLog: "an
electronic diary to help the individual more accurately recall and use
his or her past experiences to be more effective in current or future
tasks."
Subquestion
To what
extent will rapidly advancing technology reduce the enemy's predictability?
Preliminary answer
If a full sensor
network can be installed, the enemy may be come extremely predictable.
However, in the absence of direct sensing, the speed with which new
products and new types of weapons can be conceptualized, developed,
and deployed argues that it will be very hard to know what the enemy's
capability is or will be.
Subquestion
How quickly
and effectively can new doctrine be invented or adapted to new capabilities
on either side?
Preliminary answer
This is an institutional
question. Note that a failure of human institutions will tempt the development
of automated or adaptive threat detection and response, comparable to
automated computer virus characterization. Note further that such automated
response systems could be extremely dangerous.
Subquestion
Will offense
or defense be fundamentally stronger?
Preliminary answer
Since this question
must be answered for each possible class of weapon, and since MM makes
many new classes of weapon possible, it appears that offense will probably
win. However, this analysis is shallow; and because of the crucial importance
of this question, it should be studied carefully.
Subquestion
How well
can military targets be protected?
Preliminary answer
Military targets
can be dispersed, miniaturized, hardened with advanced materials, and
rebuilt quickly. The main vulnerability will be people, which again
argues for automation.
Subquestion
How well
can civilian targets be protected?
Preliminary answer
Billions of toxin-carrying
insectoid nanobots could fit in a small packing crate. Orbital or UAV-based
weapons can be deployed on a large scale. It looks like civilians and
civilian property may not be defensible without major lifestyle changes.
It's possible that a comprehensive shield could protect against some
forms of attack, possibly including nano-scale robots, but long-range
high-energy weapons may require impractical amounts of shielding.
The alternative
is to prevent the deployment of such weapons in the first place, but
this would be quite difficult to achieve by any means. A control-freak
approach would be hugely oppressive (for the protected civilians as
well as non-citizens) and may not be sustainable, and an effective policy-based
approach will be difficult to design.
Subquestion
Is an arms
race likely to be unstable?
Preliminary answer
Yes. The nuclear
arms race was stable for several reasons. In virtually every way, the
nano-arms race will be the opposite.
Nuclear weapons
are hard to design, hard to build, require easily monitored testing,
do indiscriminate and lasting damage, do not rapidly become obsolete,
have almost no peaceful use, and are universally abhorred. Nano capability
will be easy to build (given a nanofactory), will allow easily concealable
testing, will be relatively easy to control and deactivate, would become
obsolete very rapidly, almost every design is dual-use, and peaceful
and non-lethal (police) use will be common. Nukes are easier to stockpile
than to use; nano weapons are the opposite.
Also, as Mark
Gubrud pointed out, a deployed rapid-response net would be unstable.
(A hair-trigger complex system eventually will suffer a false alarm.)
One observer has argued that immune systems are not generally unstable,
and humans should be able to do even better. We disagree on three
counts. First, humans aren't close to understanding the immune system
yet, and we may have to design military systems before we do understand
it. Second, what's needed is not very comparable to a biological immune
system, so we'll be doing a lot of new engineering that'll be hard
either to test or to analyze. Third, the instability that Gubrud analyzed
is not from one defensive system reacting to disorganized and localized
threats—it's from two defensive systems reacting to each other.
The closest analogy from immunology would be graft-vs-host disease,
which is a great example of instability.
Subquestion
How hard
will it be to recover from a nanotech gap?
Preliminary answer
At the point where
a nanofactory or equivalent system is developed, even a few months difference
could be unrecoverable. The more advanced side would have access to
vastly better computers, and the technology would advance as rapidly
as their creativity allowed. There is no obvious plateau in capability
that would allow a laggard to catch up. Also, the advanced side would
be in a much better position to thwart development in its opponents,
with or without all-out war.
Subquestion
Could a
non-nano power defend itself against a nano power?
Preliminary answer
No. And even a
nuclear power might not be able to deter a nano power: aerospace superiority
(with rapid prototyping and cheap manufacturing) could make it much
easier to build an effective missile shield.
Subquestion
How could
governments use molecular manufacturing in their own countries?
Preliminary answer
This deserves
a whole study of its own. Abusive and oppressive governments could become
far worse. Any country could modernize (and militarize) very fast, depending
on how much expertise it can buy or train locally. MM could enhance
national character, for example: Americans could become more independent
/ off-grid (which could reduce vulnerability to terrorism); others could
become more socially linked through high-bandwidth connection and data-sharing;
there'll be plenty of opportunity for both laziness and productivity.
Conclusion
Military
practice and planning will have to change a lot. An unstable arms race
looks like a definite possibility. Substantial innovation will be required
to even begin to protect civilians. Development of molecular manufacturing
may have a crucial impact on national strength.
The situation is
extremely urgent. The stakes are unprecedented, and the world is unprepared.
The basic findings of these studies should be verified as rapidly as
possible (months, not years). Policy preparation and planning for implementation,
likely including a crash development program, should begin immediately.
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