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Overview of
all studies: Because of the largely unexpected transformational
power of molecular manufacturing, it is urgent to understand the issues
raised. To date, there has not been anything approaching an adequate study
of these issues. CRN's recommended series of thirty
essential studies is organized into five sections, covering fundamental
theory, possible technological capabilities, bootstrapping potential,
product capabilities, and policy questions. Several preliminary conclusions
are stated, and because our understanding points to a crisis, a parallel
process of conducting the studies is urged.
CRN is actively
looking for researchers interested in performing or assisting with this
work. Please contact CRN Research Director Chris
Phoenix if you would like more information or if you have comments
on the proposed studies.
Study
#30
How
can appropriate policy be made and implemented?
What options are
still available to choose the course of molecular manufacturing (MM)
and its effects, and how rapidly are those options disappearing?
Subquestion
In
the absence of concerted government action, when will molecular manufacturing
be developed?
Preliminary answer
Several technology
trends point to molecular manufacturing, or equivalent capability, being
developed around the 2020-2030 time frame. However, the cost of development
is falling rapidly, the paradigm is becoming well-known and plausible,
and the incentives to develop it sooner appear quite significant—the
impact on a single industry could easily be greater than $1 billion.
This indicates that individual corporations may begin development when
the cost falls below $1 billion and the time below five years.
The cost and time
may already be small enough to allow development within five years and
$1 billion. Several of the major sub-projects appear to cost less than
$10 million apiece. We don't have a cost estimate for the lab work to
build the first fabricator,
and any estimate may be revised downward by invention of an easier technique.
But the cost of a capability to build 3D structures with 20 nm feature
sizes and thousands of features may already be less than $1 million,
and limited provision of smaller feature sizes and even atomically precise
features may be feasible with off-the-shelf chemistry.
Subquestion
If
a crash program were implemented (or has already been) in the United
States or elsewhere, how soon could MM be developed, including a general
design capability?
Preliminary answer
If
a well-funded crash program had been started, say, in 1992 when Nanosystems was
published, it could succeed literally at any time. A program started
today might be limited by software and nanosystem design, requiring
maybe five years of intense Manhattan-project-level effort to develop
a CAD program, a few basic molecular machines, and several designers
capable of making products from them.
It should be noted
that software (including computational chemistry software) is relatively
cheap, and easy to work on in secret; one strategy for asymmetric development
would involve developing a full set of software and nanomechanical designs
in the absence of experimental verification, then waiting for lab techniques
to advance to the point where the lab work could be done in just a year
or two. If such program were not discovered until the lab work started,
it would be extremely hard to catch up.
Subquestion
How
quickly could the studies listed here be completed?
Preliminary answer
A detailed analysis
of all
these points might easily take a year or more, even if they were
approached in parallel.
Subquestion
How
high are the stakes?
Preliminary answer
It appears that
development of molecular manufacturing by a hostile nation would seriously
threaten the ability of any nation, including the U.S., to defend itself
or to respond effectively to an attack.
Further, it appears
that an arms race focused on this technology would probably end in a
devastating war with extremely high civilian casualties. Several other
independent disaster scenarios might cause unacceptable loss of life
in the absence of effective policy administered by an acceptable controller.
Subquestion
If
a national crash program is necessary, how quickly could it succeed?
Preliminary answer
As implied above, a crash program
started today might easily take five years. Since a major gating factor
may be the development of novel software, this time may not shrink much
in the future, though cost can be expected to decrease rapidly.
It must be emphasized that simply
implementing a crash program is not an adequate strategy to avoid disaster. In
the absence of proactive policy work and implementation of the policy
for effective administration, the existence of the technology very likely
will lead to disaster. However, as explained below, this is not
an adequate argument for postponing the development.
Subquestion
If
international cooperation is necessary, how effective could it be, and
how long would it take to establish?
Preliminary answer
If past experience is any guide,
international cooperation could take years to establish, and would at
best delay the problems.
Subquestion
How
detailed a plan must be worked out in advance? Who must buy into the
plan?
Preliminary answer
It must start
with the design of quasi-governmental administration (effectively, a
constitution as well as procedures). It must also address the practical
steps necessary to create that administration. Everyone who will have
access to the technology (including the ability to develop it independently
or acquire it through a black market) will have to buy into the plan
or else be forcibly subjected to it. Note that widespread and prolonged
use of force leads inevitably to an unsustainable conflict and/or a
human rights disaster.
An alternate view
is that it's better not to have a central over-arching administration
at all: that such an administration would be too likely to abuse its
power, while simultaneously suppressing the development of technologies
(e.g. active shields) to mitigate bad consequences. We believe that
in the absence of central administration, too much power will 'trickle
down' to bad people and groups, then concentrate and be used for destructive
purposes, creating tragedy and probably disaster.
However, central
administration may not be adequate either. An effective solution may
require the invention of new forms of administration/government, taking
advantage of rapidly organized networks and high information flow.
Subquestion
How
long will it take to set up administrative structures?
Preliminary answer
Probably several
years.
Subquestion
What
effects will public perception of 'nanotechnology' have?
Preliminary answer
It depends on
the country. In a democracy, too much fear can remove a lot of support;
conversely, realistic education about the benefits and challenges/problems
can create a massive and productive effort to solve the problems. In
other places, e.g. China, public perception probably doesn't matter
as much.
Subquestion
What
could be done to delay molecular manufacturing?
Preliminary answer
Scientists such
as Smalley, Whitesides, and Ratner have done a very effective job of
delaying investigation and development in the U.S., but this may be
about to change. CRN has heard increasing frustration and skepticism
among young scientists against the position that it's impossible. Still,
it would probably be possible to postpone U.S. attention for another
few years if key pro-MM spokespeople could be convinced to announce
that they had shifted position and now believed it was impossible to
achieve.
However, now that
a group
in Russia appears to be working on MM, delay there may not be
possible. At least one publication from Iran has announced MM as a
goal of that government. So it will probably be developed somewhere
in the world no matter what the U.S. does. If the U.S. doesn't work
on it, it might take between 5 and 10 years; if the U.S. actively
opposes development and/or sabotages programs it's aware of, it might
be stretched to 10-15 years, though this doesn't appear at all certain.
Subquestion
What
would be the effects of delaying molecular manufacturing?
Preliminary answer
If it could be
delayed three decades, its impact may already be largely eclipsed by
other powerful technologies. However, this long a delay is unlikely.
If delayed by
one to two decades, general nanotechnology progress combined with continuing
theoretical and hobby work could make it much faster and more widely
proliferated once it happens: the recipe could spread widely and quickly,
and could be easily applied. The sources and timing of development would
become increasingly hard to predict.
Also, realization
of all the benefits (reduction in poverty, improvement in health, increased
abundance providing for aging populations, avoidance of severe ecological
collapse) would be delayed. This could account for tens of millions
of deaths per year. Anyone who deliberately delays molecular manufacturing
by even a few years could go down in history beside Stalin for mass
murder by deprivation.
Conclusion
The
situation is extremely urgent. The stakes are unprecedented, and the
world is unprepared. The basic findings of these studies should be verified
as rapidly as possible (months, not years). Policy preparation and planning
for implementation, likely including a crash development program, should
begin immediately.
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